OCEAN CITY — In a case that could ultimately have local implications, the U.S. Supreme Court this week began a debate on the definition of a “seaman” for the purposes of determining if an individual can sue an employer for negligence when injured on the job under the long-accepted Jones Act.
The Supreme Court on Monday heard arguments on the definition of a seaman in terms of actually working on a vessel at sea and the dangers that entails or working on and around a dock. With countless commercial and recreational vessels in and around the resort area, the high court’s ultimate decision of the definition of a seaman could have local implications.
The specific case at hand revolves around a Chesapeake Bay pilot who often worked escorting captains and workers to and from large commercial vessels offshore. In 2008, harbor pilot William Dize was diagnosed with advanced respiratory illness after contracting lung disease while sandblasting a vessel on shore. Dize ultimately died from lung disease and his wife sued his employer, the Association of Maryland Pilots, for negligence.
The case was tried in Circuit Court, which decided Dize was not working as a seaman at the time he contracted the disease, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ultimately upheld the lower court’s decision. This week, the Supreme Court took up the debate of whether Dize was working as a seaman at the time he contracted the disease that claimed his life, and while the highest court in the country has not yet ruled on the case, it’s decision could have implications on the hundreds of men and women who work on or near the water in the resort area.
Under the Jones Act, a maritime worker may pursue a cause of action against an employer for injuries incurred within the scope of employment if the worker is deemed a “seaman.” However, the definition of a seaman is largely unclear except in terms of an individual who is “regularly exposed to the perils of the sea.”
The Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test to distinguish a seaman from land-based maritime workers. Under those tests, the employee must contribute to the function of a vessel or to the accomplishment of the vessel’s mission. Secondly, the employee must have a connection to the vessel in navigation that is substantial in both nature and duration.
As a rule of thumb, the accepted standard is that the employee must spend at least 30 percent of his or her time aboard the vessel. Time that an employee spends maintaining a vessel ashore or dockside should not be counted in the formula as they are not sea-based duties that expose the employee to the “perils of the sea.”
In the case at hand, Dize worked an employee of the Association of Maryland Pilots in a variety of capacities, some of which caused him to work on vessels at sea and at other times at the dock or in a marina maintaining vessels, cleaning or repairing the boats, buying supplies and groceries for the fleet and other duties not directly related to the water. His essential duty was a launch boat operator and included transporting pilots to and from large commercial vessels on the Chesapeake.
According to his own testimony, Dize spent only about 20 percent of his work time on a vessel at sea and another 50 percent or so of his time on maintenance, including painting, sanding, changing propellers and other parts, refueling the vessels and performing other tasks in and around port.
“Dize’s time spent maintaining vessels while they were docked onshore does not count toward the 30-percent threshold,” the appeals court opined.